Question Five. Whether the Relation of the Creature to God is the Same as its Foundation

188. And because this question [question 4, n.179] depends on a certain other question, namely about ‘the identity of the relation with its foundation’, and this when speaking specifically of the relation which is of the creature to God - therefore I ask fifth whether the relation of the creature to God is the same as its foundation.

189. It seems that it is not:

First thus: everything ‘other than God’ has a relation to him, therefore everything other would be ‘relative to something’ not only accidentally but by identity; the consequent seems impossible, because the Philosopher infers it, Metaphysics 4.6.1011a19-20, from the statement of those who say ‘everything that appears is true’.

190. Second thus: the categories are primarily diverse - from Metaphysics 5.9.1018a12-13, 10.3.1054b28-30 - and are as beings simply diverse, because being is of iself divided into them (Metaphysics 5.7.1017a22-27); therefore nothing in one category is the same as something in another category. Therefore no relation is the same as something absolute.

191. The opposite:

Any created thing whatever does not less depend on God than any created thing whatever depends on another created thing, because dependence on the First thing seems most essential; but a whole has a relation to its parts the same as to itself, because it cannot be a whole and not be made of parts; therefore, by parity of reasoning, it will have a dependence on the first cause, albeit an extrinsic first cause, the same as to itself. For although an extrinsic cause does not constitute a thing the way the intrinsic cause does, yet it causes the thing more perfectly than an intrinsic cause does; for to constitute a thing involves imperfection, namely potentiality.

I. To the Fifth Question

A. On the Identity of Relation in General to its Foundation

1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

192. [Exposition of the opinion] - Here it is said [sc. by Henry] that every relation is the same as its foundation - look at his Quodlibet 9 q.3 and 5 q.2 (which seem as it were to be contrary).

193. For this opinion multiple arguments are given:

First, that relation is transferred to God according to the proper idea of relation, and therefore there are said to be two categories properly in divine reality, namely relation and substance [1 d.8 n.130]; but if it were going to be of the idea of relation that it would be a different thing from its foundation, then in God there would be thing and thing, which is against divine simplicity.

194. And from this middle term, namely from simplicity, a general argument is made: for a ‘like white thing’ is not more composite than a white thing simply, and consequently the relation of likeness does not add anything different from the foundation; therefore neither is relation a different thing.

195. Secondly this point is argued by way of change, that if relation were a different thing from the foundation, then whatever foundation it would come to de novo would be changed - which seems to be denied by many authorities; first of the Philosopher Physics 5.1.225a34, who denies that there is motion or change in the category of relation; second of Boethius On the Trinity ch.5 (look at him there [not expressis verbis but implicity]); third of Anselm Monologion ch.25.a

a.a [Interpolation] from Boethius On the Trinity: negative and relative predicates make no composition (look at him there); third of Anselm, Monologion, “For it is clear that for a man after a year...”

196. Third an argument is made from this, that if relation were a thing different from its foundation then likeness would have its own presence in a subject different from the presence in it of whiteness; and this seems prima facie unacceptable, because a relation founded on a substance (if there is any) would be accidental because of its own accidentality - which seems against Simplicius On the Categories (f. 95r, 40v-41r) where he says that the Philosopher treats of quantity and quality before relation because relation is founded immediately on these; and it is not founded on substance immediately (and this when speaking of accidental relation), because relation founded on substance does not have a proper accidentality of itself.

197. The same preceding inference [n.196] is also proved to be unacceptable because then the genus of relation would not be simple but as it were composed of ‘in’ and ‘to’ - which seems unacceptable because the first concept of any first genus should be altogether simple, as it seems;     therefore etc     .

198. Fourth it is argued that if relation were a thing other than the foundation, then there would be an infinite regress in relations; for if this relation is a thing other than the foundation, by parity of reasoning the otherness too (which is a certain relation) will be a thing other than the foundation, and this otherness a thing other than the foundation, and so on ad infinitum; but this is unacceptable,     therefore etc     .

199. Fifth thus: relation does not have a distinction in its species save by reason of the foundation (for lordship is not distinguished from paternity by the fact it is ‘in relation to’ but by reason of the foundation - nor are these disparate relations distinguished, nor are they the same as relations of equivalence, save by reason of unity and difference of form in the foundations [n.205]); but if relation were a thing other than the foundation, it would have of itself formally a distinction in its species;     therefore etc     .a

a.a [Interpolation]: Again, if likeness in this thing [sc. one of two things alike in whiteness] is other than the whiteness in it, by parity of reasoning the likeness in the other term [sc. the other white thing the first white thing is like] is also other than the whiteness in it; therefore both foundations can be together without this likeness or that, as things prior in nature can be without things posterior in nature; and so two white things can be together and not two like things - which seems incompossible, because likeness is unity in quality.

200. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this opinion I argue first as follows: nothing is the same really as anything that it can, without contradiction, really be without; but there are many relations that foundations can, without contradiction, be without;     therefore there are many relations that are not the same really as their foundation.

201. Proof of the major: because that the ‘same being’ should really be and really not be seems to be opposed to the first principle [sc. the principle that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time etc     .], from which first principle the diversity of things seems at once to be inferred; because if contradictories are said of certain things, these things seem not to be the same in the way that the contradictories are said of them, and so if the contradictories ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ are said of them, they seem not to be the same in being or in reality, or not to be the same being.

202. There is confirmation of this, because if the major [n.200] is denied, there seems no way left for being able to prove the distinction of things; for it will be said by the impudent not only that the several natures in one supposit - as substance and accidents - are the same, but also that Socrates and Plato are the same, or that Socrates and stone or white do not really differ; and if it be argued against him that ‘Socrates can exist when a stone does not exist’ and if from this the distinction of one from the other is inferred, or if it be argued that ‘Socrates can exist and not be white’ and if from this the distinction of subject and accident is inferred - the consequence will be denied, because the impudent will deny the proposition [sc. the major, n.200] on which these consequences rely, which proposition you also deny [sc. ex hypothesi from the beginning of this paragraph].

203. This proposition too, ‘those things, one of which can persist without the other, are really distinct’, will be denied by the impudent. But once it has been denied, the whole doctrine of the Philosopher perishes, Topics 7.8-9.154a23-55a38, whereby he teaches that a proposition or problem is easily destroyed by discovery of its contradictory but is with difficulty established; but if this proposition [sc. at the beginning of this paragraph] is denied, no proposition or problem seems able to be destroyed (because if it is not destroyed by a contradiction then not by any other opposition either), or at least it seems not able easily or very easily to be sustained - because no place [sc. of argument] according to or assigned by Aristotle seems efficacious for destroying anything if this place is destroyed.

204. On this way of the philosopher is also founded the way of motion or change for proving a distinction - the way that the philosopher uses when proving that matter is a thing other than form, because it remains the same under opposed forms; the Philosopher also uses it, in Physics 5.2.220a1-11,a to prove that place is other than the things placed in it, because the same place persists along with different things placed in it.

a.a [Interpolation from Appendix A] Averroes com.3 and more manifestly in com.7 says, “If place is prior to any natural body (as Homer posits), then there could be place without body, and the place would not be corrupted on the corruption of the body.” See there.

205. The minor [n.200] is also plain in all relations whose foundations can exist without terms, as is the case with all relations of equivalence (as are similar, equal, and the like); for if this white exists and that white does not, this white is without likeness -and if that white should come to be, there is likeness in this white; therefore this white can exist with it and without it. It is similar in the case of many relations of nonequivalence; for if this man exists and he is such that no one else is subject to his power, he will be without lordship - and again he can be a lord with the accession of slaves, as Boethius says [On the Trinity ch.5]; and so it is in many other cases, about none of which is there need to adduce examples.

206. This reason [n.200] is also confirmed as to the whole of itself (because the following confirmations are valid for both the major and the minor); for if a relation is not other than its foundation, which yet remains in the relation’s absence, the incarnation seems to be denied, and the separation of accidents from the subject in the Eucharist; also every composition in things seems to be denied, and all the causality of second causes.

207. Proof of the first unacceptable result [sc. about the incarnation]: if the union of human nature with the Word is the same really as the human nature, then if the Word had never assumed that nature and made it, the same nature, absolute, then it would really have been united with the Word as it is now, because the whole reality of the assumption was assumed; also if the Word put aside the nature (while the nature itself remained in itself the same), the nature would remain really united with the Word and as really as it is united now, because the whole reality of the nature would then be preserved as it is now.

208. The proof also of the second unacceptable result [n.206], about the Eucharist: that if the same quantity of bread remains (the same as was before), and if the inherence of the Eucharist in the bread is nothing other than really that very quantity, then the Eucharist is really united to the bread (or informs it) now as before.

209. Proof of the third unacceptable result [n.206, composition in things]: because if a and b compose ab, and if the union of these parts with each other is nothing other than absolute a and b, then when a and b are really separate the whole reality remains that belongs to a and b united. And then a and b when separated remain really united and so the composite remains when the components are separated, and so the composite will not be composite - because when the composite remains while the component parts are separated, it is not composed of them; for then nothing would remain but a one by aggregation, as the Philosopher seems to conclude in Metaphysics 7.17.1041b11-19.

210. Proof too of the fourth unacceptable result [n.206, about the causality of second causes]: because whatever is caused by diverse second causes requires in them first a due proportion and coming together so that it may be caused by them; but if this coming together and proportion are only something absolute, then the causes are in this way really causative of this sort of effect when they do not come together just as when they do, and thus they can when together really cause nothing that they cannot cause even when not together; for when no other reality is posited, no thing can be caused that could not have been caused before. And thus could one have argued in the case of the third member, about the composite parts [n.209], because if a and b when separate do not compose ab, then neither do they do so when united, because just as the same thing -without any other reality - cannot cause something now which it could not cause before, so neither can the same things without any other reality compose now something that they could not compose before;     therefore etc     .

211. Seconda principally I argue against the aforesaid position [n.192]: nothing finite contains, according to perfect or virtual containing, opposites formally (because however much in God is conceded a most perfect containing of all perfections by identity that are in him, yet he cannot contain absolute opposites formally in himself, although he could have in himself such opposites virtually and such relatives formally - but from this is conceded an infinity of the foundation). But equality and inequality are opposites formally, and similarly likeness and unlikeness - at any rate relative to the same correlative term; but these can be perfectly founded on the same foundation successively. Therefore the foundation contains neither of them formally (or, more to the point, really and by perfect identity), because the reason for its not containing both is the same as the reason for its not containing either.

a.a [Interpolation from Appendix A] This reason is doubly deficient: first because the major is false of divine relations, second because the first part of the minor is false, save when making comparison to the same thing; thus there are two false premises. However the major holds the difficulty by adding to the subject the ‘nothing finite’     etc . - The minor is true when comparing equality and inequality to the same thing, and thus both are in the same foundation, though successively.

212. Third thus: the same thing does not contain many things of the same idea the same in perfect identity with itself; but many relations of the same idea are in the same foundation, as there are many likenesses founded on the same whiteness; therefore      etc. The major is plain inductively in the case of everything that contains many things by identity, because one containing thing contains one thing of the same idea.

213. Fourth thus: that which contains something by identity entails too, if it is more perfect, that what is contained in it is more perfect by identity (as a more perfect soul has a more perfect intellect - and according to those who posit that the same form is intellective and sensitive, and of corporeity and of substance, the intellective form includes a more perfect sensitive form than is the sensitive form in brutes); but a more perfect foundation does not contain in itself a more perfect relation, because not every whiter thing is more alike, as is manifest to the senses;     therefore etc     .

214. Fifth thus: things contained in something by identity are not less different if the containers of them are more distinct; but relations founded on two genera are less different than two relations founded on a thing of the same genus (nay on the same most specific species), because equality, which is founded on quantity, and likeness, founded on quality, are less different than likeness and relation of active power, which can be founded on the same heat;     therefore etc     .

215. Sixth and last thus: a relation of reason is a thing of reason different from its foundation, therefore a real relation too will be a real thing different from its foundation. The proof of the consequence is that, just as a relation of reason is the mode of the object in the first act of the intellect, and yet it is in itself not nothing in the genus of intelligibles but is in itself something truly intelligible (although it is not as or equally first as that of which it is the mode, since it is only understood by a reflex act - and so it is not as perfectly understood as that of which it is the mode), so too a real relation, although it is a mode of its foundation (and not equally first with it, nor as equally perfect as it), yet in itself it is a thing, because what is in itself nothing is the real mode of nothing; for there is no more general name than being or thing (according to Avicenna Metaphysics 1.6, f. 72rb), and so that to which being or thing do not belong has no real being belonging to it.

216. Further, the conclusion - for which these reasons have been adduced [nn.200-215] - is proved by authorities:

And first from Augustine On the Trinity 5.5. n.6, “In the case of created things, what is not spoken of as substance is left to be spoken of as accident;” here he expressly maintains that relation is an accident in creatures. Although this does not have to be understood of the relation that is of the creature to God [cf. nn.253-54, 260-63, below], yet it is certain that it holds, both in truth and in his intention, of the relation that can be lost while the foundation remains.

217. Again, Ambrose On the Trinity 1.9 nn.59-60, “If God existed first and later the Father, he has changed by the accession of generation; may God ward off this madness.” Therefore by mere accession of real relation a change could be made in a divine person, according to Ambrose - and this would not be unless that relation was a thing other than the foundation, because the foundation was there beforehand.

218. Again, Hilary On the Trinity 12 n.30, “That what was is born is already not only to be born but to undergo change by being born,” and he is speaking of the nativity of the Son of God. Therefore ‘to be born’ states a new relation.

219. Again, the Philosopher in the Categories 7.6136-37 says, “Relatives are all things that are said of others or exist to others as to what it is they are,” - and by this reasoning are substances excluded, which, although they are ‘of others’, are yet not ‘to another’;     therefore the ‘as to what it is they are’ is taken here, not for existence in the intellect, but for existence in reality. But if relations in reality are of others ‘as to what it is they are’, and a foundation is not of another ‘as to what it is’ - then the being of the latter is one thing and the being of the former another thing; therefore etc     .

220. Again, Simplicius On the Categories ‘Relation’ (f. 43r) declares expressly that relation is to another.

221. Again, the Philosopher Metaphysics 12.4.1070a31-b4 maintains that as the categories are different so also are their principles - and he exemplifies it specifically of the distinction of relation from other categories and of the distinction of the principles of relation from the principles of other categories..

222. Again, Avicenna Metaphysics 3.10 (f. 83va) seems to maintain expressly that relation has its proper certitude; and at the beginning of the chapter he maintains that it has, according to its certitude, its own presence in things and its own accidentality.

2. Objections

223. And because stubbornness is possible about relations, by conceding that they are not the same really as their foundation but that they are not different realities, and by denying that they are certain things by saying that a relation exists only in the act of the comparing intellect [Henry of Ghent] - there are arguments against this view: first that it destroys the unity of the universe, second that it destroys all substantial and accidental composition in the universe, third that it destroys all causality of second causes, and fourth that it destroys the reality of all the mathematical sciences.

224. The first is easily proved, because, according to Aristotle Metaphysics 12.10.1075a11-15, the unity of the universe exists in the order of the parts to each other and to the first thing, as the unity of an army exists in the order of the parts of the army to each other and to the leader; and from this can be asserted, against those who deny that a relation is a thing outside the act of the intellect, the word of the Philosopher, Metaphysics 12.10.1075b37-6a3, that the sort of people who speak thus “are disconnecting the substance of the universe.”

225. The proof of the second is that nothing is composite without the union of composable parts, such that, when the parts are separated, the composite does not remain; but nothing real depends on what is merely a matter of reason (and precisely of reason caused by an act of our intellect), or at any rate the sort of real that is not a product of art; therefore no ‘whole’ will be a natural real thing if for its being is necessarily required a relation and if this relation is nothing but a being of reason.

226. The proof of the third is that the causing of a real being does not require a being of reason in the cause, and because second causes cannot cause unless they are proportioned and nearby; therefore, if this being nearby is only a being of reason, causes under this being nearby will not be able to cause anything real. Because without this being nearby they cannot cause, and this being nearby (which is a relation) is no real thing, according to you [n.223, Henry] -     therefore a second cause contributes nothing to a being able to cause.

227. The proof of the fourth is that all mathematical conclusions demonstrate relations of subjects. The point is clear first from the authority of the Philosopher, Metaphysics 13.3.1078a31-b2, who says, “Of the good the species most of all are order [common measure and the definite] etc     ... and these are shown most of all by the mathematician,” because a mathematician’s art lies in proportion and the measures of certain things with each other. Secondly, this same thing is plain from experience by running through mathematical conclusions, in all of which some relative property is commonly predicated; as is plain beginning from the first conclusion of geometry, where the equality of the sides of a triangle is shown, or the predicate ‘able to be the base or side of an equilateral triangle’ is shown of a straight line; and so in all the rest, as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles (the property demonstrated of the three angles of a triangle is this, namely ‘equal to two right angles’), and so in other cases.

228. But if the stubbornness is still continued, that although relations are not formally beings of reason but something outside the intellect and not the same as the foundation, yet they are not a thing different from the foundation but are only proper modes of the thing - this objection seems to be a contention only about the term ‘mode of a thing’; for although the mode of a thing is not a thing other than the thing of which it is the mode, yet it is not no thing (just as neither is it no being), because then it would be nothing; and therefore relation falls under the division of being per se, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.7.1017a24-27. Nor is everything into which ‘being per se’ is divided an equally perfect being; on the contrary, quality in respect of substance can be called a ‘mode’ and yet quality is in itself a true thing. Thus relation, although it is a mode (though one more imperfect still than quality), yet if it is outside the intellect (and not a mode intrinsic to the foundation, as infinity is in God and the infinity of all the essentials in God, as was said in 1 d.8 nn.192, 220-221 [d.3 n.58, d.10 n.30, d.19 n.15, d.31 n.19]) it follows that such a mode, being from the nature of the thing other than the thing, is a different thing from the foundation, taking ‘thing’ in its most general sense as divided into the ten categories.

229. And if it be said that the genus of relation is a thing, not because of the mode that is a disposition to something else, but because of the thing to which the being toward another belongs - this is not true; because just as every ‘being for itself’, conceived under an absolute idea, can pertain essentially to some absolute genus provided it is per se one (for no mode of conceiving, along with which the concept ‘per se unity’ [or: the per se unity of a concept] can stand, and which concept is absolute, takes away from the thing thus conceived its belonging to an absolute concept, because what is thus conceived includes something absolute asserted of it in its whatness and something said of it in its what-sortness, whereby it is distinguished from other absolute concepts - as its genus and difference, outside the intellect), so every such respect, or disposition or relation (or however it is named, for these are synonyms), can be per se conceived as per se one, having some quidditative predicate asserted of it in its whatness (as it is outside the mind, as was proved [nn.224-227]), and distinct from that in which it is founded, as was proved in the first article [nn.200-222]; therefore a proper genus can be had of those respects as they are respects without including their foundations essentially - and so the reality of the things that are in this genus is not precisely such because of the foundations, formally speaking, because the foundation is outside the per se idea of them as they have the complete of idea of a being in a real genus.

3. Scotus’ own Conclusion

230. With the reality of relation thus made clear in the second article [nn.224-229], and its real distinction from the foundation made clear in the first article (and this as to the relations about which the reasons there adduced are conclusive[nn.200-222; the relations in question are those that the foundations can exist without]), the first opinion

[sc. of Henry, n.192] seems sufficiently refuted, whatever understanding it is posited as being understood by.

4. To the Arguments for Henry’s Opinion

231. To the first argument for the other opinion [n193] I say that nothing of any genus is said of God, as was said in 1 d.8 nn.95-115; and, just like absolutes, so relations too that are formally said of God are not of any category but are transcendentals and properties of ‘being in general’, because whatever belongs to being as it is not distinguished into finite and infinite belongs to it before it is divided into categories, and so is transcendent.

232. To the point [n.194] that a like white thing is not more composite than a white thing merely, although it could be easily expounded by stressing the force of the word, saying that ‘com-position’ is ‘position together’ [sc. ‘like’ and ‘white’ are positioned together in a like white thing but not in a merely white thing, and so a like white thing is more ‘com-posite’], however - not caring about the word - one should say as a result that a like white thing is more composite than a white thing merely, because it has in itself act and potency really distinct [sc. its potentiality to be like is now actual, while in a white thing merely its potential to be like remains potential].

233. This should also be conceded by him [sc. Henry], on behalf of whose opinion the argument was made. For he himself concedes that there is never a difference of intention without composition, and that a relation differs from its foundation in creatures by a difference of intention. He concedes too that in divine reality person is a quasi-composite and essence a quasi-potency and relation a quasi-act [1 d.5 n.52], but where there are quasi-act and quasi-potency there is quasi-composition - so there, where there is act and potency, there is truly composition (but not a composition of two absolute entities, because one entity [sc. ‘like’] is not an absolute entity).

234. To the second argument, about change [n.195], Simplicius On the Categories ‘Relation’ (f. 43r) replies: since just as relation is not in respect of itself but of another, so that to which relation applies does not change in respect of itself but of another; and if, in that case, only that is said ‘to be changed’ which is disposed to itself differently now than it was before, there is no change in the category of ‘relation’ - but if ‘to be changed’ is common to a thing’s being differently disposed both to itself and to another, then change is in the category of ‘relation’ (as Simplicius maintains), because in relation someone is differently disposed to another.

235. The Philosopher, however, because he posits that it is not possible for something to be differently disposed to another unless it is differently disposed to itself, says for this reason that there is no motion in the category of relation; hence he only shows what categories motion is first in and what it is not.

236. Again, the Philosopher shows there [Physics 5.2.225b10-11] that there is no motion in substance, and yet there is change in substance; so from the Philosopher’s intention one can only get that in the category of relation there is no motion, and with this stands however that there is change in it. And this response is confirmed by the authority of Ambrose adduced above [n.217], who concedes that relation is a thing different from the foundation.

237. To the third argument, about presence-in [a subject, n.196], I concede that relation has its own presence-in (as Avicenna says in his Metaphysics [n.222]), and yet a composition of the genus out of things essentially included does not follow, because even quality has its own presence-in (which is not of the idea of its genus formally) and yet it is not composed with a composition respecting the nature of the genus; but this is because a property is present in the thing it belongs to and is not of the per se understanding of that thing, which however seems to be more true of property than of relation.

238. When therefore it is argued that then relation founded on substance would have its own accidentally, because it would have its own presence-in [n.196] - I reply: if there is any such relation (about which the reasons adduced above, in the first article [nn.200, 211-215], are conclusive) I concede the conclusion; both parts of the antecedent [sc. relation founded on substance, and having its own accidentality] seem to be true of the specific identity of one individual with another in species, or of essential likeness in specific form.

239. To the fourth, about infinite regress [n.198], I say that it does not follow, because the relation itself is referred to the foundation; for it cannot be without a foundation, or in the absence of it, without contradiction. For when it exists, and the foundation at the same time, both are the extremes of the relation which is of the relation to the foundation; therefore it cannot be - without contradiction - in the absence of the relation of it to the foundation, and thus it cannot, without contradiction, be in the absence of its foundation - and so the relation by which it is referred to the foundation will be the same as itself (and this will be plainer in the next solution in the following question, nn.268-71).

240. To the fifth argument, about distinction [n.199], I say that relation has distinction into its species as any other genus has distinction into its species; and yet the distinction only becomes known through the foundations, because of the littleness of its entity, which it has in the foundations. So it is also in the case of other accidents, which have a greater identity and reality, that sometimes the distinction is made through extrinsic things and is known from extrinsic distinction; yet in them it is formal, intrinsic, but made known through extrinsic things.

B. On the Identity with its Foundation of the Special Relation of ‘Creature to God’

1. First Opinion

241. [Exposition of the opinion] - The point about relations in general then has been seen. About the special relation of ‘creature to God’ there is one opinion [from William of Ware] that says this relation is the same as its foundation, and this in such a way that the foundation is nothing other than a certain relation to God; for just as a creature, although in itself it is a being, yet in respect of God is called a non-being, according to Anselm [Monologion ch.31],a - so too, although in itself it is an absolute being, yet in respect of God it is nothing other than a certain respect.

a.a [Interpolation] which statement must be understood insofar as the comparison falls under negation (in this way: ‘a creature, not in comparison to God, is something’), because according to no comparison is a creature’s entity proportional to God. But the statement is false if the comparison is affirmed (in this way: ‘in comparison to God a creature is nothing’); for such speech is metaphorical, according to Anselm.

242. With this claim seems to agree the statement that relation is the ratifying of the foundation, which was rejected in 1 d.3 nn.302-329, about the vestige.

243. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this opinion there is Augustine On the Trinity 7.1 n.2, “Everything said relatively is, after removal of the relative, still something;” and again, “What is not anything in respect to itself is not anything that is said in respect of another.”

244. The foundation of a relation, therefore, is some entity formally that does not include the relation itself formally - because if it included it formally, the relation would not formally be a relation to another but to itself, for its foundation is formally to itself and the relation is being posited as formally the same as the foundation. Nor could relation be the first foundation of relation, for there would still remain the question what that first relation would be located in. It is not the case, therefore, that a relation is precisely the foundation of a relation.a

a.a [Interpolation] A reason as follows is formed: if relation is not founded in another it is not relation; so either there will be an infinite regress [sc. if relation is founded in relation] or relation will eventually be founded in the absolute. But the idea of the absolute is that it is to itself, while the formal idea of relation is disposition to another; but formal entity to itself is not the same as formal entity to another;     therefore etc     . - Again, that in whose quidditative idea there is a disposition to another is not to itself, nor is it absolute; therefore nothing created is an absolute entity.

245. This fact [sc. the foundation does not formally include the relation] is also plain in divine relations, where there is the greatest identity with the foundation; and yet the foundation is not formally the relation, because then the foundation would not be formally infinite perfection [1 d.5 nn.114, 117].

246. Secondly there is argument against the aforesaid opinion [n.241] as follows: a definition indicates the total quiddity of a thing, provided it is perfect; but the definition of stone does not include, essentially or formally, respect to another, because then it would not be the definition of stone as stone is in an absolute genus, and so it would not be of a stone as stone is in the genus of substance or as it is a species of substance; therefore in the essence of stone, formally, no respect is included.

247. Third thus: according to this opinion [n.241] creatures are not more distinguished from God than the relations in divine reality are distinguished from each other, because all opposite relations are equally distinct and especially when they pertain to the same mode of relatives; but divine relations, which are relations of origin, pertain to the second mode of relatives, to which also seem to pertain the relations that are in God by reason of efficient causality to creatures [1 d.3 n.287]; therefore if the creature is only a relation, and if opposite relation in God - as filiation - is subsistent relation, opposed to relation of Father, there will be an equal distinction on this side as on that.

248. And there is confirmation, because then a created supposit would only be a subsistent relation, and thus it would be more difficult to conceive the mode of existing of a created person than of an uncreated person.

249. And if you say that creatures differ in absolute nature among themselves but [divine] persons not so - this seems to destroy the position [n.241], because then the creature will have an absolute essence that will not be merely a relation.

250. The further consequence also seems to follow [sc. from the view that a creature is only a relation] that a creature differs less from God than one divine person differs from another, because in divine persons the relation is real and mutual, but between creature and God there is no real mutual relation [1 d.30 nn.30-31, 40, 43];     therefore etc     .

251. Fourth, to the opinion itself [n.241], as follows: things that are formally distinct are not formally and precisely the same (because then they would be formally distinct and not formally distinct, because they would be nothing but the same, formally indistinct); but the relation of creature to God is not formally or specifically distinct in diverse creatures; therefore either creatures do not differ in species or they will be precisely that relation. Proof of the minor: to all those relations - in creatures - there corresponds the same extreme on the part of God, but to relations of different idea there does not correspond a term of the same idea.

252. Fifth thus: in creatures there is a triple relation to God [1 d.3 n.287]; so a reason that the creature will be nothing but one relation is equally a reason that it will be nothing but another relation;     therefore it cannot be precisely any one of the relations. Nor can it be all of them, because they are formally different among themselves - and then any one created essence would have a formal distinction from itself. Therefore etc     .a

a.a [Interpolation] Or thus: a nature one formally and specifically is not many specifically; but any nature has three relations specifically different with respect to God, as is plain - conversely in God to creatures there are three relations of reason;     therefore etc     .

2. Second Opinion

253. [Exposition of the opinion] - Another position [of Peter of Tarantsia and Romanus of Rome, based on sayings of Thomas Aquinas] is that this relation of an angel [and of any creature] to God differs really from the essence of the angel [and any creature].

254. There is confirmation of this from blessed Augustine On the Trinity 5.5 n.6, where he says that in the case of creatures “what is not spoken of as substance is left to be spoken of as accident;” and he argues that in this case of creatures relation is an accident.

255. He also expressly maintains this in the same place 5.16 n.17, “Those things are relative accidents that occur with some change in the things of which they are said,” and he means from this that the relation of creature to God is an accident, but that the relation said relatively of God to creature is not an accident in God.

256. And from this he says more expressly toward the end, “That God begins to be called in time what he was not called before is manifestly said relatively; however it is not said as an accident of God (because something happens to him), but plainly as an accident of that in reference to which God begins to be relatively called something.”

257. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this:

Substance is said to be prior to accident in three ways (according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.1.1028a31-33), namely in knowledge, in definition, and in time; and what it is to be prior in time is so understood that there is no contradiction on the part of substance to prevent it being able to exist prior in duration to any accident; so there would be no contradiction in a stone’s being prior in duration to all dependence on

God, and as a result there would be no contradiction in a stone’s not depending on God, which seems absurd.a

a.a [Interpolation] Or thus: if the relation of creature to God is other than the creature, it is naturally posterior to the creature; but what is prior in nature can exist without what is naturally posterior -as far as it itself is concerned - without contradiction; therefore a stone can exist without a respect to God - therefore it can exist without a term for the respect, which includes a contradiction. The first proposition, the major, is plain, because a relation cannot be prior; for a relation, being founded on the absolute, cannot exist prior to it - nor can it exist simultaneously in nature with it, for the same reason; therefore it is posterior, because it is an accident of it. The second proposition, the minor, is plain, because the idea of ‘naturally prior’ is that - as far as concerns itself - it can be without the other, and in this way, according to the Philosopher, substance precedes accident.

258. Further, Augustine is either taking ‘accident’ generally there [nn.254-56] for anything changeable - and then any created substance is an accident, because it is changeable; or he is taking it there for what is changeable, that is, able to be lost (namely because it can be lost when something remains, and because it is posterior in nature or in duration to the something that remains); if in this second way, then the relation of creature to God is not an accident, because a creature cannot remain either in duration or in nature without that relation.

259. And it seems that Augustine is speaking in this way in 5.4 n.5, in the way some accidents are inseparable: “Just as the color of a raven’s feather is black - but it loses the color, not indeed as long as it is a feather, but because it is not always a feather. Wherefore the material itself of the feather is changeable, and because it ceases to be a feather, so it loses the color also.”a The loss of color however is not a change, because thus indeed the loss of the feather would be a change; but the loss of color is a loss, because just as the feather is prior in nature to the blackness, so too it could be posterior in nature to the blackness, that is, not be at once corrupted together with the corruption of the blackness.

a.a [Interpolation] because while the raven remains it cannot lose the blackness, but it can lose feathers and certain other things.

3. Scotus’ own Solution

260. As to this question then [question five, nn.188, 241], I say that the relation to God common to all creatures is the same really as the foundation; it is not however the same formally, nor is it the same precisely (or not the same with adequate identity), such that the foundation is only relation formally [cf. on real identity and formal non-identity, 1 dd.33-34, nn.1-3].

a. The Relation of Creature to God is the same really as its Foundation

261. The first point is proved by two reasons:

Because what is said properly to be present in something, and in the absence of which the something cannot be without contradiction, is the same as the something really; but relation to God is properly present in a stone, and in the absence of this relation a stone cannot be without contradiction; therefore the relation is the same really as the stone.

262. Proof of the major: because just as a contradiction stated of certain things is a way of proving distinction, so an impossibility of receiving the predication of contradictories pertaining to being is a way of proving identity in being - and this when there is no essential dependence that requires a manifest distinction (which I make clear thus: because the impossibility that a [e.g. a creature] is without b [e.g. relation to the Creator] is either because of the identity of a with b or because of its priority or simultaneity in nature with b; therefore if b is not naturally prior to a nor necessarily simultaneous in nature with it, and if a cannot be without b, the result is that a is the same as b; for if b is other than a or posterior to it, it is not likely that a could not naturally be in the absence of b without contradiction); but what is present in something properly, as relation is present in the foundation (that is, what is so present in what it is present in that if it were other than what it is present in then it would be posterior to what it is present in), is not prior in nature nor simultaneous in nature with what it is present in; therefore if what is present in something is necessarily required for the being of what it is in, such that what it is in cannot be without it, necessarily it is the same really as what it is in. So it is as to the issue at hand.

263. The minor [n.261] is manifest, because just as it is impossible for a stone to be without God, so it is impossible for it to be without its dependence on God - for it could be without the term of the dependence in just the same way as it could be without the dependence; for being without the term is not incompossible save because of the dependence itself - but something ‘not necessary simply’ is not the idea of what is simply necessary;     therefore etc     .

264. Against this reason [n.261] I raise the objection that then [sc. if relation to God were the same really as the creature] any relation that is present in the divine essence through act of the divine intellect would be the same as the essence (proof: it is incompossible for the essence to be without it - for if such a relation could be new then the divine intellect could change, which is impossible); but to posit that such a relation is the same as the essence is unacceptable, because then it would be real (for whatever is the same as a thing is real); but the relation is not real (from 1 d.31 nn.6, 8-9, 16, 18); wherefore     etc .a

a.a [Interpolated note] Again, the relation of likeness is not the same as whiteness, and yet it is necessarily present when the term is in place; therefore      if the term were necessary, the relation would simply necessarily be present - and yet it is not then more the same, because it is not more intrinsic to the term just because the term is incorruptible. Likewise there is this argument: if the term were corruptible the relation would not be the same as the foundation, therefore neither is it the same when the foundation is incorruptible. - This reason well shows that incorruptibility of the term does not make per se for this identity; but incorruptibility of the term in comparison with the foundation does well make for it, that is, if it is simply impossible for the term not to be unless the foundation is not - and further, if this is the first relation of dependence of the foundation on a term, because then by reason of the foundation there is simply this necessity of coexistence; because of the first of these points [‘if it is simply impossible for the term not to be     etc .’] the relation, according to one opinion, of vision to the object would be that of identity - because of the second of them [‘and further, if this is the first etc .’] the dependence of our nature on the person of the Word in Christ would not be identical with our nature.

    Again, a relation to something simultaneous in nature as to a term is posterior to the foundation (as likeness is posterior to whiteness); therefore      also a relation to something prior in nature to the term can likewise be posterior. Nor does it therefore follow, from the fact that the foundation’s being without the term is a contradiction, that the foundation’s being without the relation is a contradiction [nn.262-263].

    These two reasons [sc. in the preceding two paragraphs] are probable reasons against the first reason about the contradiction of ‘being without each other’ [n.261]. Likewise, the foundation cannot generally be without a respect that is other than it (as body and figure); therefore the inference ‘not without this, therefore the same as this’, when the thing in question is a respect, does not follow.

    Against the other reason, namely that a respect common to everything other than the term is not the accident of anything [n.266], has a logical instance against it, that creation is not created (a concrete is not asserted of an abstract). Again, more really: ‘inherence accidentally’ is itself present in a thing but whiteness is not; therefore a relation is itself related but the foundation is not. There is therefore not the same reason of standing in the first case and the second. [Vatican editors: these interpolated objections are left without answer.]

    Note, in the year 1304 (almost at the end): ‘the two extremes are the one total cause of relation’; later differently: ‘because the foundation is the total cause of relation but the term is a sine qua non’ (just as fire is the total active cause of heat but wood is a sine qua non), such that the foundation is prevented from causing as long as it does not have the term. [Vatican editors remark that the first note in this paragraph is the regular teaching of Scotus; the second or later note is nowhere found in him.]

265. I reply. The incompossibility of a separation can be by reason of that from which something is inseparable, and it can be by something extrinsic. An example of the second: because, according to the Philosopher, for the heaven to be without motion would be a contradiction, not indeed from a cause intrinsic to the heaven (because the heaven is receptive of motion, indifferent to rest and to motion), but from an extrinsic moving cause; yet it does not follow that the heaven is [the same as] its own motion, although it cannot be without motion. Now I say that the incompossibility of being a stone without dependence of it on God is by reason of the stone precisely; and by this reason is also the reason for the incompossibility of being a stone without a term for the dependence of it - and whatever is the reason for requiring a term of dependence is the reason for having the dependence. But in the objection adduced [n.264], there is no necessity for the inherence simply of such relation, nor any incompossibility of the nonbeing of the object on the part of the divine essence itself (as if it were impossible for the essence to be unless it required a term ‘to which’ and this term was unable not to be), but there is only incompossibility from an extrinsic cause, namely the divine intellect (a cause, I say, simply necessarily acting), and the incompossibility is on the part of the intellect’s doing something new.

266. The second principal reason for the first member of the solution [nn.260-61] is as follows: what is uniformly said of everything other than the term [of a relation] is not accidental to anything that is said relative to that term; the relation of creature to God is of this sort [sc. said uniformly of everything other than the term];     therefore etc     .a - and so it is the same as the foundation.

a.a [Interpolation] but such a relation, common to every creature, is uniformly said ‘of everything other than God’ in relation to God himself; therefore it is not accidental to any creature.

267. Proof of the major: because if it were accidental to one it would, by parity of reason, be accidental to another; as, for example, if the relation of effect to cause were accidental to the stone (and would consequently be a thing other than the stone), then by parity of reason this relation would have the relation of effect to God - and then another relation of effect would be accidental to the first relation, and so on ad infinitum.

268. Against this reason [n.267] I raise the objection that there appears nothing unacceptable in relations proceeding to infinity; for it was said in 1 d.19 n.6 that relation is founded on relation, as proportionality on proportion. From this the argument goes as follows: if Socrates is the same as Plato then the sameness of Socrates is the same as the sameness of Plato, and by parity of reason the sameness is the same as sameness; and the first sameness [sc. of Socrates with Plato] is a thing other than the foundation, because the foundation could be without it; therefore by parity of reason any sameness will be a thing other than that which it belongs to, and so there will be infinite real relations. And so can it be argued about proportions and likenesses.

269. To this I reply that there is a stand in the second stage [of the infinite process]. To understand this, let the first foundations be taken, namely Socrates and Plato, between which there is mutual sameness, and let this sameness in Socrates be called a and that in Plato b; let the sameness of a with b be called c, and let the reverse sameness, of b with a, be called d. I say that a differs from Socrates because Socrates can be without a (because he can be without the term of a), and a cannot be without the term; however a does not differ from c but c is the same as it, because a cannot be without b (since they are by nature together); and consequently it is a contradiction for a to be unless both the foundation of that which is c and also the term of it are. But when the foundation and the term of c exist, c will necessarily exist - so it is a contradiction for a to be without c; and c is formally present in a, because a is said to be the same with the very sameness that is c; therefore c is the same as a, and consequently a stand will be made there.

270. And if you ask by what sameness c is the same as a, I say that it is so by a itself, because the sameness is only one of reason, for it is simply of what is the same as itself.

271. In the same way there is a stand in likenesses of proportionalities, because one proportionality is like another with essential likeness (but two individuals of the same species are said to be alike in specific form), and so just as there is a stand in specific sameness in the second stage [of the process to infinity] (and not in the first stage), so too in the case of likeness of proportionalities.

b. The Relation of Creature to God is not the same formally as the Foundation nor is it precisely the same

272. As to the second article, namely that a relation is not formally the same as its foundation [n.260], I suppose this to be manifest from the understanding of what it is to be ‘formally the same’, because the per se idea of a respect does not formally include the idea of an absolute, nor conversely does the idea of an absolute per se include the formal idea of a respect; likewise, as to what is there added [n.260], that the foundation is not precisely the relation itself, this was proved against the first opinion [nn.243-52].

273. And then I understand how there can be a true and non-precise identity in the following way:

When, in the case of creatures, something contains another thing by identity, or is unitively many things, this is not because of the perfection of what is contained but of the perfection of what contains - just as, if the intellective soul (according to some) contains the vegetative soul and the form of substance, this is not because of the perfection of the form of substance (because it does not contain all the others), but because of the perfection of the intellective soul. Likewise, let it be that being contains any property at all of being (as truth, goodness, and unity), yet this containing is not from the perfection of what is contained but from the perfection of what contains - just as also in divine reality, the fact that relation is the same as the foundation is not from the perfection of the relation (as if it contains the essence by identity), but from the formal infinity of the essence, because of which the essence has in itself relation by identity.

274. In all these cases (and especially in the case of creatures) the container is not precisely the contained, but is an entity as perfect in itself as it would be if the contained were outside the container and added to it - nay, a more perfect entity, because by its perfection it contains every other entity; hence the intellective soul is not merely substantial form (because then it would not be perfect), but is as perfectly the ultimate entity - which is there - as it would be if it presupposed entity other than itself.

275. So I say in the issue at hand, that the foundation is not only the relation (which it contains by identity), but is as absolute as it would be if the relation were added to it, or if it had altogether no relation; but this is not because of its own perfection [sc. as foundation], but it is because of perfection (either simply or in some way or other), because the foundation contains the relation by identity, so that the containing itself prevents the accidentality of the relation from being able to be an accident, because it is perfectly contained in the substance - which relation, however, if it were not thus contained, would of itself not perhaps have the fact that it is the substance by identity.

C. To the Principal Arguments

276. To the principal arguments of this fifth question.

To the first, from Metaphysics 4 [n.189]. It is said that Aristotle infers that ‘everything is relative to something’, that is, ‘relative to opinion and sense’. - But on the contrary: the consequent should differ from the antecedent in a proposed conclusion [1 d.3 n.316].

Therefore I say that it is unacceptable to say that ‘all things are relative to something’ such that their being is formally to be relative to something else, as the opinion said which posits that all appearances are true [n.189] - which opinion also said that the being of a thing is formally appearance. And I do not in this way concede that ‘all things are relative to something’ such that their being is formally relative to something -rather their being is formally to themselves, although this being contains by identity the being of things that are relative to something else.

277. As to the second [n.190], although its conclusion could be denied of relatives or of things in diverse genera (and they would then be said to be primarily diverse as far, namely, as concerns their formal reasons, such that none of them formally includes another or anything of another, although by identity in existing one contains another), yet it can be said - in consequence of what has been said elsewhere [n.231] - that this sort of relation is transcendent, because what belongs to being before it descends to genera is transcendent; but what belongs to every being belongs to it before it descends to genera; therefore anything such is transcendent and does not belong to any genus. And so these relations that follow being before it descends to beings of any genus will, since they are transcendent, not be of any determinate genus.a

a.a [Interpolated note by Richard of Sloley] against the first response [n.277]:

    Then, for the same reason, the powers of the soul could be set down as qualities and yet be really the same as the substance of the soul, because the reason that something in one accidental category - for instance relation - is the same in reality with substance is also a reason that something in another accidental category should also be. Again, nothing finite includes by identity anything primarily diverse from it; therefore substance does not include a relation of the genus of relation.

    Against the second response [n.277]:

    That which is of a determinate genus cannot be the same as that which is of some other genus but is transcendent. Again, what is a substance to one thing is not an accident to anything (from the Philosopher and Commentator, Physics 1.3.186a32-b12). Again, then an absolute thing and a comparative thing would not be contraries nor the first differences dividing being, because -according to Aristotle - great and small are not contraries because they are present in the same thing [Categories 6.5b11-6a11]; the second point is plain, because the first differences divide more than the second ones (but the second differences dividing being, when one says ‘another substance, another quality,     etc .’ are primarily diverse; therefore     ). Again Avicenna Metaphysics 3.10, f 83rb, “There is no relation which is not an accident;” again On the Soul 5.2, f 23va, “Substance is not of itself referred to anything in any way.”

D. To the Authority for the Second Opinion

278. As to the authority of Augustine for the last opinion [nn.254-56], I concede that ‘relations in creatures are accidents’ in the case of relations of creatures to what they do not essentially depend on; but as to what something essentially depends on, its essential dependence on it is not an accident of it, that is, is not something really different from it.

279. And then to the first [n.254], which is adduced from ch.5, that “what is not spoken of as substance is left to be spoken of as accident,” one must expound ‘spoken of as accident’ in the sense that it is not predicated per se in the what of a thing, and along with this that it is also changeable, not while the foundation remains, but by change of the foundation; and the first condition here fails in the case of essential (or rather substantial) predicates said of creatures, and the second condition fails in the case of divine relations - but both when concurrent are sufficient [sc. for something to be spoken of as an accident].

280. And so can the last authority [n.255] from ch.19 be expounded, that “they are accidents”, ‘in the case of things to which God is said’ [n.256]; that is, they are simply changeable but not losable - and they are said ‘by way of accident’ [n.256], that is, are not said essentially of their subjects; and one condition fails in the case of divine relations.

II. To the Fourth Question

A. Solution

281. As to the fourth question, about creation [n.179], I say that creation seems to import not only relation to God in idea of efficient cause but also a respect to preceding not-being, and this in order of duration, as creation is properly taken. But this order can be understood to be either to immediately preceding not-being or to not-being taken indistinctly; and in the first way a thing is said to be created only in the first instant - in the second way a thing can be said to have always been created, as long as it persists.

282. If we speak of the first relation (namely to the efficient cause), the solution is plain from the preceding question [the fifth question, n.260].

283. If we speak of the second relation [sc. order to preceding not-being], the relation seems not to be the same as the foundation - and this follows from the first way [n.281], insofar as the relation belongs to the thing in the first instant, provided the respect to not-being persists only in that instant; but what is absolute persists after that instant, and what does not persist is not the same really as what does persist.

284. If we speak of the order to not-being taken indistinctly, the same conclusion seems to hold [sc. that the relation is not the same as the foundation], unless proof can be given that it is contradiction for the essence to be without a respect to a preceding not-being in duration. But if there be proof (in the third question asked [n.95]) that it is a contradiction for a stone to be without a respect to a preceding not-being in duration, then it could be said as a consequence that the respect does not differ from the foundation save in that the respect is not a dependence on something on which what has the foundation essentially depends; and it was said generally in the preceding question [the fifth question, n.260], not that ‘every respect is the same really as its foundation’, but that ‘every respect of dependence on something, without which the dependent thing cannot be, is the same as the dependent thing’ [nn.261, 263, 265, 278]. But if it is not a contradiction for a stone to be without such respect and order to not-being, then it is plain that the order is not the same as the foundation.

285. Thus, therefore, creation is the same as the foundation either, according to one opinion, as to both respects that it states [nn.282, 284], or, according to the first opinion, at least as to the first respect (though not as to the second [n.282]).

B. To the Principal Arguments

286. One can reply as to the first argument [n.180] that the authority is speaking precisely of things that are included per se in the quiddity of the thing as it is quiddity (as quiddity excludes one and many, act and potency, because nothing such is of the per se understanding of quiddity); and in this way I concede that no relation is formally the same as the foundation, even if it is sometimes really and by identity contained in it, as is the case with the issue at hand.

287. As to the second [n.181], it is plain that the respect to God in question remains not only in the first instant but always, as long as the thing remains - as will be said below in d.2 n.62.

288. As to the third [n.182]. Although the statement ‘God cannot renew the same motion’ is not true (there will be discussion of this in 4 d.43 q.1 n.8, q.3 n.7), yet, if this is conceded, it is conceded because of the interruption, which according to them prevents the sameness of a renewed motion with a motion that has been destroyed. But this does not happen with the issue at hand save in that the same creation cannot be renewed insofar as it states an immediate order to not-being, but not insofar as it states a respect to the cause; hence, the same respect can be renewed, because the same maternity was in the mother of Christ (in relation to Christ) after the resurrection as before [4 d.43 q.1 n.13].

289. To the fourth [n.183] one can concede that creation as undergone is in the fire from the generating fire (namely the creation by which everything other than God is said to be created, whether it is created or generated); but the consequence does not hold ‘if creation is in the fire from the generating fire, therefore the creation is related to the generating fire as to the term’ - for likeness is in this white thing and in that from what generates it, and yet the likeness does not have to be related to the generator as to the term.

290. As to the fifth, the argument about change [n.184] - there seems to be a difficulty there both about the major and about the minor. I say that in natural change there is matter and form and agent and composite of matter and form and many respects (to wit: the respect of the agent to the produced composite, and conversely a respect of the produced composite to the agent, a respect of the matter to the form and conversely, and a respect of both to the whole and conversely, and a respect of the composite and of the present form to the preceding opposite; and not only were these absolutes preceded -namely composite and form - by their opposites, but the respects of matter to form and conversely, and the respects of form to composite and conversely, these too were preceded by their opposites, and so there can be respects of all these respects to their opposites; nor is this all, but also all these respects are from the agent, and so there can be respects of all these respects to the agent) - such that about these many respects, taking those that relate to the issue at hand, matter has respect to form as the perfectible and that which is perfected to its perfection, and these are coeval with the existence of the composite; this respect too is from the agent, which effectively induces the form and perfects the matter with this formal perfection, such that there is founded on this respect, which is ‘of matter to form as of receptive to perfection or of perfectible to perfection’, a respect of the passive thing to the agent; this respect too succeeds to its opposite, because the matter was previously unformed. These three respects seem to be what is meant by passive change, namely: the respect of matter to form as of perfective to perfection or of perfectible to perfection; the respect of passive or produced thing to the agent or producer; and the respect of a later thing to the preceding opposite. But two of these respects, namely the first and third, seem to concur in change absolutely (when not comparing change to the agent), and these are expressed by the idea of change whereby something is said to be changed ‘because it is disposed differently now than before’; if ‘disposed’ expresses the respect of matter to form or of the perfectible to the perfection which it is thus disposed to, this is what is actualized by that perfection; if ‘differently than before’ expresses it, here is another respect, founded on some respect of matter to form or of perfectible to perfection. And if one adds that change means that something is disposed differently now than before by some changer, here is a third respect.

291. As to the issue at hand, therefore, one can say that change, properly taken, is not the same as form (because then change would remain while the form remains), nor is it the same as the respect of matter to form or conversely (because then it would always remain while this sort of respect remains), nor is it the same as the respect of the whole to the opposite or conversely of the opposite to the whole (because then it would likewise remain while the composite remains) - but it is the order of matter to form as a new and immediate order to such form; and neither of these orders is an essential dependence on anything on which what has the order depends, and so neither is the same as the absolute thing. In this way then the major of the reason [nn.184-85] is conceded.

292. And to the minor [nn.184, 186] I say that creation is the producing into being of the whole created thing without presupposing any part of it - such that, although the created thing has two parts (one of which naturally precedes the other and receives it as its perfection), yet it is created as a whole. The first term of creation does not seem to be any part but total being, or at least it is so if we are speaking of a created angel, where nothing is a potential receiving something actual the opposite of which it was under previously.

293. And then if change is called ‘a new relation of the potential to the actual’, such that the potential pre-existed in itself and yet without the actuality, it is plain that no creation is change, because nothing potential pre-existed creation.

294. But if change is called ‘a new actualization of a potential’, such that the potential did not pre-exist under the act nor need it have pre-existed in itself - then in this way the creation of an angel is not change, because there is nothing potential in it. Yet it could in this way be said that creation of fire was change (if fire was created), because in fire there would be a potential and it would be actualized by form and it would be disposed differently now than before; not that it is ‘differently disposed than it was before’, but that it was ‘not disposed before as it is now’. And it seems that in the definition of change the ‘being disposed differently now than before’ should not be taken positively, because it is plain that the reference is not to a subject but to the term ‘from which’; but the term ‘from which’ of motion is properly not anything positive but is a privation, according to the Philosopher Physics 5.1.224b35-5a16.

295. I say then that either no creation is change, if change is that a potential always has to have pre-existed and be newly actualized by a received form (because the potential of no created thing pre-existed), or at least no creation of a simple is change, if it is sufficient for change that a potential was not in the act it is in now and was thus newly in act through change. But, in whichever way it is taken, the immediate order to not-being [n.281], by reason of which it was conceded that change differs from form [n.291], is also the reason by which it was conceded that creation is not the same really as the foundation [n.283], for the order immediate to not-being is not the same if it only remains in the first instant, just as, on account of the same order, creation does not remain in the same instant as form.